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Sullivan: "What I've Learned About Judging"

“WHAT I’VE LEARNED ABOUT JUDGING”
Frank Sullivan, Jr.∗
It is a great honor to have been asked to deliver this lecture,
particularly in light of the distinguished individuals who have preceded
me in this series. I am also every bit as honored that all of you have
taken your time to be here.
My association with this law school began almost twenty years ago.
I have been extended friendship and multiple courtesies from deans,
professors, administrators, and students. I have been honored to serve
on Dean Jay Conison’s National Council. Jay, as you prepare to leave us
for a new venture, we salute you and thank you for everything you have
done for this great school. I have learned a great deal by attending many
lectures here including perhaps the greatest lecture I have ever heard
anywhere, Professor Ronald Dworkin’s “Must Judges Be Philosophers?”
on November 29, 1999.1
Ed Gaffney and Richard and Rosemarie Stith have provided Cheryl
and me with memorable experiences during sessions of the Cambridge
summer program. Faculty members generously critiqued my LLM
thesis at a colloquium here. This school provided two of my law clerks,
Susan Oliver Martello and Melina Villalobos—and JoEllen Lind steered
me to a third, her wonderful daughter, Erin Shencopp. I have been
inspired beyond measure by the brilliance, the courage, the grace, and
the goodness of Rosalie Levinson. For all of this and much more, my
profound thanks.
I want to acknowledge some special friends of mine in the
audience—judges with whom I have worked closely and from whom I
have learned much and the aforementioned Erin Shencopp. And I could
not be more pleased and flattered at the presence of a very special friend
of mine from here in Porter County, Patricia Bengert, whose late
husband, Daniel Bengert, was my high school debate coach, English
teacher (read: Shakespeare), wise mentor, and cherished friend. Thanks
to each of you for coming.
As you have heard, Governor Evan Bayh did me the high honor of
appointing me to the Indiana Supreme Court effective November 1,
∗

Professor of Practice, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Justice,
Indiana Supreme Court (1993–2012). LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law (2001);
J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law (1982); A.B., Dartmouth College (1972).
These remarks were delivered on February 28, 2013, as the annual Supreme Court Lecture
at the Valparaiso University Law School. The author expresses his appreciation to the
faculty, staff, and students for their splendid hospitality.
1
Valparaiso University Notes, NORTHWEST IND. TIMES (Nov. 24, 1999, 12:00 AM),
http://www.nwitimes.com/uncategorized/valparaiso-university-notes/article_7f2e674ed13d-5da4-be6d-3da181785ce6.html.
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1993. I had had no prior judicial experience. I take from the fact that you
have invited me here tonight, that after nineteen years you are—at last—
willing to overlook that deficiency in my qualifications. Still, since I had
no experience with judging when I started on the court, it is fair to ask
today what I’ve learned about judging.
LESSON #1: JUDGING IS MORE THAN ADJUDICATION; IT IS ALSO
ADMINISTRATION
For twenty-five years until his retirement approximately one year
ago, one man stood at the helm of the Indiana judicial system—Chief
Justice Randall T. Shepard.2 Chief Justice Shepard was a great
adjudicator, to be sure, but he knew that the quality of the judicial
decision meant little if justice was not actually delivered. He taught us
all that the proper and effective administration of the courts goes handin-hand with the fair and impartial resolution of cases. In doing so, he
initiated and supported countless initiatives in support of a vision of
Indiana where: (1) the judges are highly qualified and well-trained,
come from diverse backgrounds, and enjoy superior reputations for
fairness, integrity, and efficiency;3 (2) the courts are properly funded,
equipped, secured, and staffed, have relatively balanced workloads, and
operate under rules of procedure that reflect best practices;4 (3) courts
with specialized jurisdiction—juvenile courts and “problem-solving”
courts—achieve great success in addressing the needs of troubled
children and children in trouble, and of individuals dealing with issues
such as drug abuse, mental illness, and re-entry from incarceration;5 (4)
Justice Randall Terry Shepard, COURTS.IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/citc/
2828.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
3
See Kevin Brown, Tribute to Randall Shepard, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter
2013) (unpublished manuscript at 4) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review)
(stating that Chief Justice Shepard was the driving force behind the Indiana Conference for
Legal Education Opportunity (“ICLEO”) Program); Andrew R. Klein, Justice Shepard and
Diversity in the Legal Profession: The Legacy of ICLEO, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter
2013) (unpublished manuscript at 5) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review)
(explaining Justice Shepard’s efforts to start ICLEO despite the national program losing
most of its funding); María Pabón López, The ICLEO Mentoring Legacy of Chief Justice Randall
Shepard: An Essay; 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2013) (unpublished manuscript
at 4) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) (stating that Chief Justice
Shepard played an instrumental role in the creation of ICLEO). ICLEO’s goals are to assist
minority, low-income, or educationally disadvantaged college graduates in attending law
school and entering the legal profession. López, supra.
4
See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Chief Justice, Indiana Supreme Court, Burdened but
Unbowed (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/2453.htm (addressing
Indiana’s efforts to establish a respectable court system).
5
See Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court Reform,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1535, 1549–51 (2006) (calling for a reform movement that looks to what
2
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the courts are equipped with twenty-first century technology that
maximizes court efficiency and provides court information to those who
need it;6 and (5) litigants have effective access to the courts without
regard to financial circumstances.7
Partnered with the Indiana Supreme Court in these endeavors are
the hundreds of men and women who serve as judicial officers
throughout our state.
They recognize the importance of both
adjudicative work and administrative work, and they are totally
committed to seeing a vision similar to the one I have just articulated
become a reality—and not just for their courts or for their counties but
for our entire state. They make our justice system work, and they
deserve our admiration and appreciation.
LESSON #2: JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS MATTER
During my time on the Indiana Supreme Court, I saw two
candidates for the Illinois Supreme Court spend more than $9.3 million
seeking to be elected in 2004.8 One was strongly supported by plaintiff
personal injury lawyers, the other by business and insurance interests.9
All the while, the appeal from a multi-million-dollar jury verdict against
State Farm Insurance was pending before the court.10
During my time on the court, the New York Times wrote a major story
about how candidates for the Ohio Supreme Court had raised more than
$21.2 million over the prior decade seeking to be elected, while routinely
sitting on cases involving parties or groups filing amicus briefs from

other state supreme courts have done to create special problem-solving courts); Kathryn
Dolan, Indiana Juvenile Court to Be Featured in Nationally Broadcast Documentary,
COURTS.IN.GOV (July 31, 2008), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/press/2008/0731.html
(reporting Chief Justice Shepard’s desire to continually evaluate the juvenile court system
to see how it can help children and families in trouble).
6
See About: Mission Statement, COURTS.IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jtac/
2373.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (explaining that in 1999 the Indiana Supreme Court
created its Judicial Technology and Automation Committee).
7
See Shepard, supra note 5, at 1543–46 (describing the need to assure equal access to
justice).
8
Whitney Woodward, 2010 Justice Kilbride Retention in Illinois, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 843, 855
(2012).
9
See Edward J. Kionka, Things to Do (or Not) to Address the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469, 475 (2006) (“[I]n the 2004 election, tort reform, business,
insurance, medical, and legal groups on the right side of the political spectrum contributed
about four-and-one-half million dollars to Judge Karmeier’s campaign. Interests on the
other side of the spectrum contributed a like amount to Justice Maag’s campaign.”
(footnote omitted)).
10
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 810 (Ill. 2005).
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which they had received campaign contributions.11 During my time on
the court, contribution-fueled television advertising in a campaign for a
seat on the Michigan Supreme Court described one candidate as soft on
terrorists and sexual predators and the other as a pawn for big business
who literally slept on the job.12
Unlike our neighbors to the west, east, and north, the justices of the
Indiana Supreme Court do not rely on campaign contributions and
television advertising to obtain their seats. We have instead a merit
selection system, in place since 1970, in which the governor appoints the
members of the court from a list of nominees compiled by a judicial
nominating commission consisting of lawyers and non-lawyers alike.13
Once appointed, justices stand for periodic yes/no retention votes.14
This method of judicial selection and accountability helps assure that
people of integrity, impartiality, and intelligence are appointed. The
involvement of the governor and non-lawyer commission members,
along with periodic retention votes, helps assure accountability. The
absence of contested elections means that there is no perception either
that justice in Indiana is for sale or that lawsuits are decided in response
to party or interest-group contributions. We are fortunate to have such a
system for the reasons I have indicated, and I hope that you will all join
me in committing ourselves to preserving it.
LESSON #3: JUDGING BENEFITS FROM EXPERIENCE
Many judges and legal theorists, as well as law school orientation
and commencement speakers, have expropriated Holmes’s aphorism—
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience”15—so I
feel no compunction in doing so either.

Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01
judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see James Nash, Ohio’s High-Court Races Are Flush with
Cash, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 16, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/local/2010/08/16/ohios-high-court-races-are-flush-with-cash.html
(recognizing
that Ohio Supreme Court candidates spent $21.2 million from 2000 to 2009); see also JAMES
SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DECADE OF CHANGE
78–85 (2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecade
ONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf (detailing the amount spent on state judicial elections in
each state between 2000 and 2009).
12
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 30, 35.
13
IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9–10; see Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IN (last visited
Sept. 30, 2013) (identifying that appellate courts undergo a similar selection process).
14
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
15
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
11
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Now I unselfconsciously said at the outset that I had no prior judicial
experience at the time of my appointment to the court, but that is not to
say that I had no experience with the real-life issues that were to come
before the court. When asked in settings like this for an example of a
case in which my real-life experience informed my judging, I often tell
the story of Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin.16
In 1992, while I was recovering from a serious automobile accident,
my doctor wrote me a refillable prescription for Vicodin. When I tried to
refill the prescription, the pharmacist told me that she could not do so
until she contacted my physician since I had consumed the pain-killer at
a rate faster than that prescribed. Later, my doctor would tell me that he
was furious that the pharmacist had not simply refilled the prescription
as his written instructions had directed and that she had no business
questioning his written order.
In the Hooks SuperX, Inc. case, McLaughlin also consumed painkilling drugs at a rate much faster than prescribed.17 However,
McLaughlin’s pharmacist followed the physician’s written instructions
without question.18 A subsequent lawsuit contended the pharmacy had
breached its legal duty of care by allowing McLaughlin to consume
drugs at a rate that posed a threat to his health.19
Now, our court did not need my auto accident experience to
conclude—as it did—that pharmacists are professionals who have a legal
responsibility to exercise judgment in their work; that they are not—as
my own physician seemed to think—robots or automatons whose job it
is to follow the orders of MDs without question. However, I do think
my experience helped us identify some nuances of the physicianpharmacist-patient relationship that made for a better opinion and for
better law.
No judge will have relevant experience on every case that comes
before his or her court. However, as I hope my Hooks SuperX, Inc.
example demonstrates, the more relevant real-life experience that can be
brought to bear in judging, the better the judging.
One way to bring more relevant real-life experience to bear in
judging is by enhancing diversity among those involved in the decisionmaking process. Men and women from different backgrounds and
experiences than our own often produce new perspectives on issues—
and entirely new ways of looking at, examining, and solving problems.

16
17
18
19

642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994).
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
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This is why diversity among judges on multi-member appellate courts is
so desirable.
Hardly anything about the last nineteen years of my life approaches
the satisfaction of the keen friendships that I have developed with the
twenty-eight lawyers who served as my law clerks. A major part of the
reason I say that is because of how much they taught me—to be sure,
some of it merely generational: as each year went by, the clerks were
that much younger than me!—as women, African-Americans, Hispanics,
and Asian-Americans, they brought background and experience to the
issues confronting our court that I simply did not have.
There is one last point about the relationship of experience to
judging that I want to make. Just because a judge on a multi-member
court has prior personal experience related to a matter before the court—
like my experience with consuming medicine faster than prescribed—
does not privilege that judge’s view on the merits as to the outcome of
the case. Chief Justice Shepard had a lot of experience in local
government administration and that experience was helpful to all of us
in understanding zoning disputes.20 But, that did not mean that we
deferred to his view as to the outcome. Chief Justice Dickson worked as
an insurance adjuster while in law school and that experience was
helpful to us in understanding insurance disputes.21 Yet, that did not
mean that we deferred to his view as to the outcome. Nor did the
background and experience of my clerks dictate how I would vote.
But the life of the law has been experience, and the more experience
that can be brought to bear on legal questions, the better the answers will
be.
LESSON #4: JUDGING IS OFTEN A DANCE WITH THE LEGISLATURE
If I channeled Holmes in discussing judging as experience, here I
draw from a contemporary jurist in discussing judging as a dance with
the legislature: Wisconsin’s Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson. In
1991, Chief Justice Abrahamson authored an article entitled Shall We

20
See Photo Release—Old National Appoints Former Chief Justice Randall Shepard to Corporate
Board of Directors, OLD NAT’L BANCORP (July 9, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://globenewswire.
com/news-release/2012/07/09/272979/261538/en/Photo-Release-Old-National-Appoints
-Former-Chief-Justice-Randall-Shepard-to-Corporate-Board-of-Directors.html (stating that
Chief Justice Shepard served in local government before serving on the Indiana Supreme
Court).
21
Dan Carden, Gary Native Takes Helm as Indiana’s Acting Chief Justice, NWI POLITICS
(Mar. 25, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/garynative-takes-helm-as-indiana-s-acting-chief-justice/article_a5f33d63-3647-5dad-98e4-21453f
2fd8e5.html.
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Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation.22 It
described how court decisions can provoke a legislative response
followed by additional court decisions—a sort of “dance” or
“dialogue.”23
During my tenure on the court, the statehouse was a veritable
discothèque. One of the most famous dances actually started in this
building. In the fall of 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court held oral
argument at this law school in Barnes v. State, a criminal case in which
the defendant had been convicted of battery on a police officer.24 He
appealed, contending that his conviction conflicted with his common law
right forcibly to defend his home against invasion.25 When our court
rejected his defense, the legislature passed a statute expressly
authorizing an individual forcibly to resist police officers in the
individual’s home in specified circumstances.26
Another example of Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dance is Estate of
Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, where the estate of an Allen County Sheriff’s
Deputy—who had been killed by a fugitive felon—sued the parents of
the killer.27 The parents had assisted their son in avoiding arrest by
hiding him in their lake cottage;28 the murder weapon was a gun
belonging to the parents that the son took from the cottage.29 The estate
sought damages from the parents on the theory that they had failed to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of
their firearm.30 We allowed the estate’s claim to proceed, and the
legislature thereupon passed a law providing immunity from civil
liability for any act or omission related to the use of a firearm by another
person if the other person obtained the firearm illegally.31 Had this law
been in effect at the time the deputy was killed, the parents would have
been immune from suit because their son had stolen the firearm from
their cottage.
Those of you who had occasion to watch or read Chief Justice
Dickson’s excellent 2013 State of the Judiciary speech to the legislature last
22
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991) (expanding on the William B.
Lockhart Lecture that Justice Abrahamson delivered at the University of Minnesota in
March 1990).
23
Id. at 1045, 1055.
24
946 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011).
25
Id. at 575.
26
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(i) (West Supp. 2013) (as amended by P.L. 189-2006, § 1).
27
786 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ind. 2003).
28
Id. at 267.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-20-1 (West 2011) (as added by P.L. 80-2004, § 5).
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month saw that he spent some time on this very subject of the dance or
dialogue between the courts and the legislature.32 “[O]ur two branches
each respect the other’s essential function,” he said. “You determine
public policy and make the laws, and we follow and apply them—
whether we agree or not. And if you disagree with the way we interpret
a statute, you amend it as you wish.”33 Now I want to associate myself
with Chief Justice Dickson’s central point—that it is the legislature and
not the courts that, in his words, “determine public policy and make the
laws.”34 I will speak more to this in a few minutes. To emphasize my
agreement, I need to tell you about two more types of cases.
In Ross v. State, a defendant was convicted of and sentenced for a
misdemeanor violation of Indiana’s handgun statute.35 Then the trial
court increased the sentence using a statute specifically designed to
increase sentences for repeat handgun violators.36 The trial court
increased the sentence yet again using the “habitual offender” statute
generally designed to increase sentences for repeat offenders no matter
what their crime.37 We held that once the sentence had been increased
using the specific handgun statute, it could not be increased again using
the general statute unless the legislature specifically said so.38 After our
decision, the legislature moved in the direction of our opinion by
removing certain offenses and categories of offenses from eligibility for
increased sentences using the general habitual offender statute.39
Now let me tell you about Citizens State Bank of New Castle v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., where our court catapulted a junior lien
into a senior position after foreclosure and transfer of the property.40 I
took the position in dissent that the junior lien was not entitled to the
priority the court gave it.41 The legislature then passed a law overruling
the court’s majority opinion, effectively writing my dissent into the
Indiana Code.42
I hope you can see that sometimes the legislature overrules the
court’s opinions; sometimes it acts in furtherance of the court’s opinions;

32
Brent E. Dickson, Chief Justice, Indiana Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary (Jan. 23,
2013), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/2480.htm.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
729 N.E.2d 113, 114 (Ind. 2000).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 115–17.
39
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2012) (as amended by P.L. 291-2001, § 226).
40
949 N.E.2d 1195, 1201–02 (Ind. 2011).
41
Id. at 1202–03 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
42
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-8-4 (West Supp. 2013) (as added by P.L. 130-2012, § 7).
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and sometimes it effectively adopts a dissenting opinion. It's quite a
dance, isn't it?
LESSON #5: JUDGING’S PLACE IN A SEPARATION OF POWERS DEMOCRACY IS
TENUOUS
In our constitutional order, the legislative branch is given the power
to make law; the executive branch is given the power to administer the
laws. Their decisions are effectuated through majoritarian politics. Our
constitutional order entrusts resolving disputes to the judicial branch
and insulates its decisions from majoritarian politics. We call this
dimension of the constitutional order “separation of powers” or, in
Indiana, “separation of functions.”43
One of the most important lessons I have learned about judging is its
tenuous place in a separation of powers democracy. On the one hand,
separation of powers gives the law-making power to the legislative
branch, not the judicial branch; on the other hand, where the law in a
case is not clearly established, a judge makes law in the course of
exercising the judicial branch power to resolve disputes.
I raise here the problem familiar to many of you—the “[c]ounter[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty,” to use Professor Bickel’s apt description
coined fifty years ago.44 Doing what separation of powers entrusts the
judiciary to do—resolve disputes—inevitably requires exercising powers
entrusted to the majoritarian branches. This is why we have the policy
of judicial restraint which, as the Supreme Court has said, is not “merely
procedural” but rather is “one of substance.”45 The policy’s ultimate
foundations “are found in . . . the necessity . . . for each [branch of
government] to keep within its power.”46
This is easier said than done, of course. How on earth do judges not
act upon their personal political and policy preferences—that is what I
have concluded “judicial restraint” means—when presented with a case
where the law is not clear? And not only when confronted with
constitutional cases, but also cases like Heck as originally presented or
Barnes or Ross?
Among the ways I tried to keep my personal and policy preferences
from impinging upon my votes on cases before our court was being alert
to whether cases were “ripe” or plaintiffs had “standing.” “Ripeness
relates to the degree to which the defined issues in a case are based on
See IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (laying out Indiana’s separation of functions).
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
45
Rescue Army v. Mun. Court. of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947).
46
Id. at 571.
43
44
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actual facts rather than on abstract possibilities, and are capable of being
adjudicated on an adequately developed record.”47 Here is an example:
an applicant for a permit to operate a landfill challenged the
constitutionality of a statute that required applicants for such permits to
disclose their criminal histories.48 Because the Indiana Department of
Environmental Management had not begun considering the application,
we concluded that the case was not ready or “ripe” for our review.49
The standing requirement is grounded in this same philosophy:
“[C]ourts act in real cases, and eschew action when called upon to
engage only in abstract speculation.”50 We deployed the requirement of
standing in the case of Pence v. State, in which future-Governor Mike
Pence, then a private citizen, challenged the constitutionality of a statute
increasing legislative pensions on grounds that it violated the Indiana
Constitution’s requirement that statutes be limited to a single subject.51
We held that Pence did not have standing because “[f]or a private
individual to invoke the exercise of judicial power, such person must
ordinarily show that some direct injury has or will immediately be
sustained.”52
It is tempting to think that judges can act on personal preferences in
common law cases—contract, property, and personal liability claims—
where no statute or constitutional principle is at stake. Indeed, common
law is sometimes called “judge-made law.”
However, because
separation of powers demands judicial restraint, judges cannot decide
common-law cases based on personal preferences any more than they
can in statutory interpretation or constitutional ones.53
One way to avoid utilizing personal political and policy preferences
in deciding common law cases is stare decisis—adherence to precedent.
Justice Thurgood Marshall makes my point in a 1986 opinion—stare
decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded
in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby
contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government,
both in appearance and in fact.”54

47
Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ind.
1994).
48
Id. at 335–36.
49
Id. at 337.
50
Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995).
51
Id. at 487.
52
Id. at 488.
53
See discussion supra notes 45–46 (explaining judicial restraint and the importance of
separation of powers).
54
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986).
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There is a particular value to precedent in common law cases,
specifically that reliance interests are often at stake. Individuals and
businesses will have ordered their affairs—and will often purchase
insurance—based on their understanding of the existing consensus as to
legal principles governing contract, property, and personal liability.
“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
involved,” Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1991.55 This is also the point
of one of Justice Brandeis’s most famous aphorisms: “[s]tare decisis is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”56
One of the most dramatic examples of adherence to stare decisis in
common law cases during my tenure on the court manifested itself in a
decision just a few days before my departure. At issue was the so-called
“pollution exclusion” in the standard business comprehensive general
liability insurance policy, providing that the policy will not cover an
insured’s liability for personal injury or property damage caused by
“pollutants.”57 Early on in my tenure on the court, in American States
Insurance Co. v. Kiger, we held that the exclusion was too ambiguous for
the insurance company to enforce.58 Two days before I left the court, in
State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., the court once again
held the policy exclusion unenforceable.59 In doing so, Justice Rucker
wrote, “Indiana decisions have been consistent in recognizing the
requirement that language of a pollution exclusion be explicit. ‘To
unsettle the law . . . would show scant respect for the principle of stare
decisis.’”60 He concluded by writing, “[w]e see no reason to abandon
settled precedent.”61
Precedent will not resolve every dispute. Precedent may be
distinguishable; precedent may be obsolete; indeed, precedent may not
exist. A particularly good source for legal principles to apply in such
circumstances is the work produced by the American Law Institute
(“ALI”). Consisting of lawyers, judges, and law professors of distinction,
including members of this faculty, the ALI addresses uncertainty in the
law by developing “restatements” of legal subjects for use by courts and
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376
(1938).
57
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 2012).
58
662 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ind. 1996).
59
964 N.E.2d at 852.
60
Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2639–40 n.4 (2011)).
61
Id.
55
56
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lawyers applying existing law. These “restatements of the law” contain
clear formulations of common law, meant to reflect the law as it
presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a court.62
I could give you a lot of examples of our court turning to
restatements to help us decide previously unanswered questions of
common law. In fact, I was always willing to consider an argument to
overrule precedent that was grounded in a restatement. There are, of
course, sound reasons for not adhering to stare decisis. For example,
Justice Brandeis stated that not adhering to stare decisis is appropriate
where a decision was “rendered upon an inadequate presentation of
then existing conditions, but the conditions may have changed
meanwhile. Moreover, the judgment of the court in the earlier decision
may have been influenced by prevailing views as to economic or social
policy[,] which have since been abandoned.”63 Justice Kennedy has
written for the Court that stare decisis need not be adhered to where a
precedent is not workable, antiquated, or not well-reasoned.64
However, mindful of our separation of powers constraints, the fact
that precedent may be legitimately overruled does not give a judge
license to adopt a personal political or policy preference instead. This is
why restatements are so helpful—they allow a judge to present to the
court a legal rule of the law as it presently stands based on careful study
by lawyers, judges, and professors.
Here is but one example of many. Creasy v. Rusk is an opinion of
mine in a tort case that I understand is widely taught in law schools.65 A
nurse sued her patient for injuries suffered when she was kicked by the
patient, a person with Alzheimer’s disease, while she was trying to put
him to bed in a nursing home.66 One of the issues in the case was
whether the general duty of care imposed upon adults with mental
disabilities is the same as that for adults without mental disabilities.67 At
the time of the Creasy case, Indiana precedent held that a person’s mental

See STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 379 (9th ed. 2009)
(explaining that the ALI first adopted restatements “for the law of agency, conflict of laws,
contracts, judgments, property, restitution, security, torts, and trusts” between 1923 and
1944).
63
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376
(1938).
64
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009)).
65
730 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. 2000); see DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 92 (6th ed. 2009).
66
Creasy, 730 N.E.2d at 661.
67
Id.
62
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capacity was a factor in determining whether a legal duty existed.68
However, we found that “contemporary public policy in Indiana[,] as
embodied in enactments of our state legislature,” then “reflected policies
to deinstitutionalize people with disabilities and integrate them into the
least restrictive environment.”69 We found this to be more in accord with
the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 283B and adopted it,
articulating that “mental disability does not excuse a person from
liability for ‘conduct which does not conform to the standard of a
reasonable man under like circumstances.’”70 When the ALI produced
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm, the
Reporters’ Note to section 11, comment e, singled out Creasy for
particular mention.71
The policy of judicial restraint applies with particular force in
constitutional cases. When a court declares a statute unconstitutional,
the court tells the legislature that notwithstanding its lawmaking
authority, this particular law goes beyond that authority. Some would
say that that is a good thing because there are many laws that Congress
and the Indiana General Assembly never should have enacted and it is
good for a court to tell them so. But, apart from the counter-majoritarian
difficulty that we have been discussing, declaring a statute
unconstitutional oftentimes places highly controversial subject matter
beyond legislative compromise. When a court declares a statute
unconstitutional, it is not just engaged in lawmaking, it is affirmatively
restricting the ability of the legislative branch from engaging in its
constitutional function of making law. And when highly controversial
subject matter cannot be compromised, dire consequences can flow from
the inability of the contending legislative factions to compromise.
I offer our court’s performance in the property tax case, State Board of
Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John, as an example.72 At the time
litigation began, real property was assessed based on its “true tax
value.”73 “True tax value” was not market value but rather was based on
“cost schedules” that took into account replacement cost, physical
depreciation, and obsolescence, causing the value to vary depending
upon whether the property was industrial, commercial, agricultural, or
Id. at 662.
Id. at 664–65.
70
Id. at 663, 666 (adopting as law the Restatement’s position that “a person with mental
disabilities is generally held to the same standard of care as that of a reasonable person
under the same circumstances”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
71
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 reporters’
notes cmt. e (2010).
72
702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998).
73
Id. at 1037.
68
69
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residential.74 This was alleged to violate a provision of our Indiana
Constitution that mandates the General Assembly to provide “for a
uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation.”75 The
Indiana Supreme Court held the “true tax value” system to be
unconstitutional.76 To be precise, the court declared the “cost schedules”
used to calculate the “true tax value” unconstitutional because they did
not meet the requisite uniformity and equality requirements.77
As you can see, the court’s decision placed the ability to compromise
the competing interests of industrial, commercial, agricultural, and
residential taxpayers beyond the power of the legislature in ways that
had occurred for many decades. The consequences were dire, especially
for owners of more expensive homes in older urban neighborhoods like
Miller in Gary, Twyckenham Hills in South Bend, and Meridian Kessler
in Indianapolis.78
When I was on the court, my views on the reach of judicial review in
constitutional cases comprised the position of only one justice, and you
are very nice to give him an audience this afternoon to present his views.
My principal attempts at articulating them came in Town of St. John,79 the
property tax case just mentioned, and another case called Municipal City
of South Bend v. Kimsey.80 In both cases, our court declared that the
challenged enactments violated the Indiana Constitution.81 In both cases,
I dissented.82
I stated my objection to the majority’s ruling in the property tax case
as follows:
I can think of no area where we can be more confident of
the ability of the normal democratic processes working
as they should than in taxation.
Residential,
commercial, industrial[,] and agricultural interests can
Id. at 1037 n.4, 1038–39, 1042.
IND. CONST. art. X, § 1; Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1038 (describing Indiana’s
constitution as requiring “uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation and for just
valuation”).
76
Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1043.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Cordell Eddings, Neighbors Are Bracing for Tax Bills: Meridian-Kessler Residents
Fear Another Hike in Property Taxes Will Force Some to Leave Area, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June
15, 2007), http://archive.indystar.com/article/20070625/LOCAL18/706250397/Neighbors
-bracing-tax-bills (reporting on increases in property taxes after the Town of St. John
decision).
79
Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044 (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting).
80
781 N.E.2d 683, 697 (Ind. 2003) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 697; Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1043.
82
Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 697 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044
(Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting).
74
75
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well pursue and protect their respective interests in state
tax policy before the executive and legislative branches
without judicial intervention.83
In Kimsey, the court struck down a statute that restricted the ability
of cities in St. Joseph County to annex suburban territory because it
violated a prohibition on “special legislation” contained in Article IV of
the Indiana Constitution.84 My answer was that “[t]he legislation at issue
here represents a political struggle between suburban and urban
interests. While the geographic focus of this particular law was St.
Joseph County, the legislative history shows a hard-fought battle in
which the suburban interests narrowly prevailed.”85 The court had
“intervene[d] to turn those who lost a close fight in the [l]egislature into
winners.”86
Now I did not much like assessing property based on “true tax
value” and had advocated a market value system when I was Indiana
State Budget Director. I certainly would have voted “no” on the law at
issue in Kimsey had I been a legislator. However, I hope you understand
the thrust of my dissents. My view in these two cases was that
separation of powers demanded that the court not intervene to
invalidate statutes where it was clear that the majoritarian political
process had worked in exactly the way the constitution intended.
Competing interest groups brought their views to the legislature and the
legislature acted on those views, making compromises it deemed
appropriate along the way.
Now what is the counterargument to my position? It is pretty
straightforward, is it not? When presented with a constitutional
question, courts have the duty to answer it. Justice Boehm forcefully
made this point while writing for the majority in the Kimsey case:
Justice Sullivan in substance argues for a doctrine of
nonjusticiability of Article IV issues. But for over
seventy years precedent has uniformly rejected [his]
view. . . . As we held in Dawson v. Shaver [in 1822], citing
Marbury v. Madison:
“The task is delicate and
unpleasant, but the duty of the Court is imperative, and
its authority is unquestionable, to declare any part of a
statute null and void that expressly contravenes the

83
84
85
86

Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044 (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 698 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
Id.
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provisions of the constitution, to which the legislature
itself owes its existence.”87
Justice Boehm was right that I argue for a doctrine of
nonjusticiability when it comes to judicial review of legislative
enactments where there is no suggestion that the majoritarian process
did not work properly. Justice Boehm maintained that the majoritarian
process did not work properly in the Kimsey situation,88 and I contended
that there was no way a court could reach that conclusion.89 However,
all of this is a level of detail that I simply do not have time to get into
today.
What if the majoritarian process has not worked properly in a
particular case? Would I still treat the claim as non-justiciable? In
arguing against my position, Justice Boehm deployed the
reapportionment decisions of the 1960s to attempt to demonstrate the
necessity for judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes.90 “What,
Sullivan, do you say about this?,” Justice Boehm’s position asks.
“Shouldn’t the court have intervened to rectify malapportionment? And
if your answer to that is ‘yes,’ how do you justify not intervening in cases
like Town of St. John and Kimsey?”
I find my answer in the famous footnote four of Justice Stone’s
opinion for the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.91 Carolene Products Co. is an otherwise little-known case in
which a federal statute protecting the milk industry was challenged on
grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause and the Fifth
Amendment.92 The Court rather summarily dismissed the constitutional
challenges, citing the Court’s obligation to presume that Congress had
acted rationally.93 But the Court added a footnote—footnote four—at
this point, saying that scrutiny of a statute for constitutionality may be
warranted in one of three circumstances: (1) where the statute appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Bill of Rights; (2)
where the statute “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation;” and (3)

87
Id. at 695–96 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Dawson v. Shaver, 1
Blackf. 204, 206–07 (1822)).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 698 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
91
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
92
Id. at 145–46.
93
Id. at 152–54.
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where the statute reflects prejudice against particular religious, national,
racial, or other discrete and insular minorities.94
Notice what happens in these three circumstances. In the first, the
court is in a position where it cannot avoid ruling on constitutionality. If
the legislature takes action that facially violates a constitutional
provision, the court can hardly defer to the legislature as the legislature
has no authority to make a statute in violation of the plain language of
the constitution.
As to the second, separation of powers demands the proper
functioning of the majoritarian process, and so it is entirely appropriate
for a court to assure that the legislature’s exercise of its lawmaking
authority does not extend to undermining the majoritarian process. As
footnote four reads, the legislature’s lawmaking authority does not
extend to “restrict[ing] those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”95 The proper
functioning of the majoritarian process must not restrict the legislature’s
ability to pass self-correcting legislation. Note that Justice Boehm’s
malapportionment example falls snugly into this exception to my rule of
non-justiciability.
As to the third—legislation prejudicing religious, national, racial, or
other discrete and insular minorities—the point is that courts may need
to step in to assure that the majoritarian political process respects the
constitutional rights of minorities. Why? Simply because their being in
the minority may prevent them from having sufficient political influence
to protect their rights in a majoritarian process.
My position is that in judicial review for constitutionality, separation
of powers counsels, if not demands, that the legislative branch has free
reign when it comes to political and policy preferences, including those
regarding taxes and annexation. The court’s power of judicial review
should be constrained to instances where the legislature has tread upon
the very face of the constitution; tread upon the self-correcting features
of the majoritarian process; or tread upon the rights of those whom the
constitution, but not the majoritarian process, protects.
LESSON #6: JUDGING REQUIRES COLLEGIAL COLLABORATION, EVEN IN
DISSENT
During my years on the court, I had the good fortune of serving with
judges for whom collegiality was a conspicuous character trait. Here is a
photograph of everyone I served with except Justices Richard Givan and
94
95

Id. at 152 n.4.
Id.
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Mark Massa. From the left are Justice Robert Rucker, a graduate of this
law school, former-Chief Justice Shepard, who will be honored here later
this spring, Justices Ted Boehm, Myra Selby, Roger DeBruler, and Steven
David, and Chief Justice Dickson.96 Each was the most wonderful of
mentors and friends, as were Justices Givan and Massa.
Let me start with the topic of dissent, about which I want to say two
things. First, earlier I quoted Justice Brandeis: “[I]t is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”97
By the end of my judicial career, I had come to the conclusion that this
was not always the case, but it sometimes was the case. People needed
to know what the rules of law were by which they should organize their
affairs—for example, buy insurance and the like—and that what the
actual rules were was not nearly as important as whether they were
clearly established. In such situations, I think dissent is of little utility
and some detriment. Once a rule is established and reliance interests set
in, the likelihood of abandoning that precedent is slight and the
advisability of doing so questionable. What does dissent do in such a
circumstance except to undermine the clarity of the rule?
I decided that in cases where it was more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled correctly, and
where no one else on the court shared my view of what the rule should
be, I would throw my lot in with the majority and make the opinion
unanimous. But what about those cases where I concluded that it was
more important that the law be settled correctly, or where I had another
justice with me? In such circumstances, I did dissent.
My muse was former Justice Roger O. DeBruler. Justice DeBruler, as
many of you know, was the longest-serving justice on our court during
the twentieth century—and the second longest-serving justice ever.98 He
sat on the court during a period of time when he frequently found
himself in dissent. His dissents are models of decorum. Some judges or
justices say they “respectfully dissent.” Justice DeBruler respectfully
dissented. The fact that his dissents were tightly reasoned, not
overstated, and were written in a straightforward, declarative style—not
punctuated with hyperbolic rhetoric—meant that when a new
generation of justices joined the court towards the end of his tenure and
96
For a replication of the photograph referred to in this lecture, see Charles F. Pratt,
Farewell to the Chief, IND. CT. TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://indianacourts.us/times/2012/05/
farewell-to-the-chief/.
97
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
98
See Randall T. Shepard, On the Retirement of Justice Roger O. DeBruler, 30 IND. L. REV. 7,
7 (1997) (stating that Justice DeBruler was second in years of service only to Justice
Blackford of the nineteenth century).
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following—justices with names like Shepard, Dickson, Sullivan, and
Boehm—the DeBruler dissents of years gone by became the majority
opinions of the Indiana Supreme Court.99 I know I did not achieve the
high standard that Roger set, but whenever in dissent, I tried to emulate
his style.
Now the last thing I want to say about collegial collaboration, and
the last thing I want to say in this lecture, is about our court’s record in
what I will call “Democrat versus Republican” cases. To be clear, these
are cases where the two political parties are literally on the opposite
sides of the “v.” I spoke at the outset of these remarks about the
felicitous judicial selection system we have in Indiana for our appellate
judiciary. Nevertheless, each of us is appointed by a governor of a
particular party and, at least until this point in time, each appointment to
the court has been a person of his or her appointing governor’s party.
Before appointment to the court, I was several times a campaign
manager for a Democratic member of Congress; Randall Shepard was
Vanderburgh County Republican Vice Chairman in Evansville.100 Yet,
separation of powers demands judicial restraint—that we not decide
cases based on political or party preferences. Given where we came
from, is that really possible?
I think you will be pleased with the result. For the entire time that I
was on the Indiana Supreme Court, the political balance was 3–2 in favor
of the Democrats from January 1995 to October 2010 and in favor of the
Republicans before and after those dates. Yet, during that entire

Frank Sullivan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Roger O. DeBruler, 30 IND. L. REV. 11, 11 (1997).
By way of example are the following cases:
[Justice DeBruler’s] dissent in Kerlin v. State, [265 N.E.2d 22, 25–27 (Ind.
1970) (DeBruler, J., dissenting),] arguing that certain evidence of prior
offenses was inadmissible, was later adopted by the court in Lannan v.
State[,] [600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992)]; his dissent in Patterson v.
State, [324 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. 1975) (DeBruler, J., dissenting),]
arguing that certain out-of-court statements were inadmissible
hearsay, was adopted by the court in Modesitt v. State[,] [578 N.E.2d
649, 652–53 (Ind. 1991)]; and [Justice DeBruler’s] dissent in State ex rel.
Rondon v. Lake Superior Court, [569 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind. 1991)
(DeBruler, J., dissenting),] arguing for limitations on a petitioner’s right
to a change of judge in post-conviction relief cases, was adopted by the
court in State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court[,] [626
N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind. 1993)].
Id. at 11–12. (footnotes omitted). Many other examples of Justice DeBruler’s dissents that
were subsequently adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court are also noted and explained.
Id. at 12; see Kenneth M. Stroud, Justice DeBruler and the Dissenting Opinion, 30 IND. L. REV.
15, 15 (1997) (noting that Justice DeBruler authored more than 500 dissenting opinions).
100
Resume of Randall T. Shepard, ST. IND., http://www.ai.org/judiciary/press/docs/
pr120711-shepard-resume.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
99
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nineteen year span, there was not one “Democrat versus Republican”
case decided on a party-line vote. Not one. These cases included
drawing new district boundaries for the City-County Council of
Indianapolis,101 determining who won the general election for mayor in
Terre Haute,102 contentious issues concerning satellite voting sites in
Lake County during the 2008 general election,103 deciding who would be
the Secretary of State of Indiana when the incumbent was abdicated
because of a felony conviction,104 and determining the constitutionality
of the Voter ID Law.105 Each and every one of these was decided by a
bipartisan vote.
It does not violate the confidentiality of the conference room to say
that these results were not always easy to obtain—although as I think
about it, they were not as hard to obtain as you might think. Each of us
felt a special obligation to try to reach consensus in matters that were
critically important for the parties before us but also critically important
for the institutional integrity of our court. We each recognized that our
own point of view was not the only point of view and that we could rely
on each other’s good judgment and goodwill in reaching a solution. In
each circumstance, we were able to do so.
I am very proud to be able to say that. I hope you will take pride too
in the fact that by virtue of our merit selection system, the judgment of a
collection of very good governors, and Hoosier good fortune, your
Indiana Supreme Court has been able to put party preference aside in the
acid tests of resolving disputes between the two political parties. I
would go further still and say that our performance in the “Democrat
versus Republican” cases is indicative of the fact that we were able to set
aside personal political and policy preferences in all our cases. Of
course, that is as it should have been, for before us in each such case
were individuals and entities who had come to us to vindicate their legal
rights and seek protection for their nearest and dearest interests.
CONCLUSION
This has been a long and sprawling talk about some of the lessons I
have learned about judging during the wonderful almost-nineteen years
that I had the honor of serving on the Indiana Supreme Court. The court
today is in great hands with five extremely intelligent and hard-working
justices presiding over our state’s judicial system and giving their
101
102
103
104
105
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Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Ind. 2003).
Burke v. Bennett, 907 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ind. 2009).
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considerable talents to deciding the cases before them. I hope my
remarks today tell you as much about the challenges of their work as my
own experiences. Further, I hope that you will give them that same full
measure of support and encouragement that you have given me these
past two decades.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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